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Despite concerns and criticism, municipality upon municipality has approved regulations that enable ride-
hailing, a digital platform activity, to legally operate. Th is paper frames and scrutinizes three prominent tensions 
surrounding the operation and expansion of ride-hailing using the City of Toronto as a case study. It fi nds that 
whereas scholarly debate emphasizes defi nitions, distinctions, legal arguments and inequality, municipal debate 
has centered on ride-hailing’s brief yet controversial history, inputs to the regulation process, and connections 
between ride-hailing, municipal governance and innovation.  Th is paper highlights the role of municipalities in 
establishing policy directions for the 21st century city that address changing and challenging issues, the impact 
of which reach far beyond the digital platform economy.   
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Résumé
Malgré les préoccupations et les critiques, nombreuses sont les municipalités  qui ont approuvé des règlements 
qui permettent les applications de « ride-hailing », une plate-forme numérique, d’opérer  légalement. Cet article 
examine les tensions entourant l’opération et l’expansion d’application de « ride-hailing » de la ville de Toronto. 
Nous constatons qu’alors que le débat des académiques insiste sur les défi nitions, les distinctions, les arguments 
juridiques et les inégalités issues de ces applications numériques, le débat pour les municipalités fut concentré 
sur la brève existence, quoique controversé, de l’expérience de ces applications, des apports au processus de la 
régulation, et les connexions entre ces applications numériques et la gouvernance municipale et l’innovation. Cet 
article met en évidence le rôle des municipalités dans l’établissement des orientations politiques pour la ville du 
XXIe siècle qui traitent de questions qui confrontent des enjeux exigeant en pleine évolution. L’impact de ces 
orientations politiques va bien au-delà de la plate-forme numérique de l’économie.
Mots clés: « ride-hailing », plate-forme numérique de l’économie, la réglementation municipale, Toronto
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Introduction
Scholarship associated with the rise of sharing economy activities connected to digital platforms began in earnest 
in the early 2000s with work by Benkler (2004) who acknowledged the early economic potential of sharing 
activities when combined with digitization. Despite beginnings associated with the potential for digitization 
to create new models for sustainable consumption and community (Schor 2014), digital platform economy 
models, particularly for fi rms associated with rides and rooms, turned towards rapidly scaling, profi t-seeking 
international fi rms whose impacts on cities and urban regions are most profound (Davidson and Infranca 2016).
Th e speed and scale at which platform activities have appeared to disrupt traditional industries in the 
ground transportation sector, combined with debates regarding the role of government policy and regulatory 
approaches in addressing upheaval and change, is not without precedent. As Biber et al (2017) demonstrate, 
ahistorical perspectives towards dealing with disruptive technologies and innovation are problematic in 
many respects. Still remarkable however, is that since Lyft fi rst entered the on-demand taxi sector in 2012 
(Lashinsky 2017), the demonstrable impacts on urban ground transportation in cities around the world is 
impossible to ignore. In 2013, the fi rst regulations to enable ride-hailing as a distinct ground transportation 
activity were introduced as California became the fi rst state to regulate transportation network companies in 
September 2013 (Ha 2013). 
To suggest that criticism of ride-hailing abounds is an understatement. Prominent critiques range from the 
cavalier attitude of upstart ride-hailing fi rms towards laws regulating their use (Edelman 2017), allegations of 
sexism and harassment embedded in fi rm culture (Sottek 2017), criticism of employment practices, particularly 
those connected to distancing ride-hailing fi rms from drivers (Levintova 2016); unethical business practices 
(Lashinsky 2017); and local lobbying and advocacy eff orts in which multinational fi rms deploy disproportionately 
large budgets, and hire superstar lobbyists to strategically infl uence public policy (Rauch and Schleicher 2015). 
Despite concerns and criticism, municipality upon municipality has approved regulations that enable the 
operation of ride-hailing. It bears noting that there are examples of municipalities, states or nations that have 
denied permission for ride-hailing to operate outside of traditional taxi regulations such as in Th e Netherlands 
and across the province of British Columbia. However, in the case of Canada, ride-hailing fi rms are regulated 
in two-thirds of Canada’s largest municipalities. Traditional ground transportation industries and agencies— 
including especially taxi but also car rental fi rms, public transit systems, and increasingly the automotive 
manufacturing sector—are being pushed as a result to reconsider their business models, openness to innovation 
and change, and future strategic directions. 
Th is paper frames and scrutinizes three prominent tensions surrounding the operation, expansion and 
regulation of ride-hailing as a predominantly urban phenomenon using the City of Toronto as a case study. Th e 
three key tensions presented and examined are: 1) the controversial history and background of ride-hailing in 
Toronto; 2) local debates that position ride-hailing against taxi and question the validity of regulating ride-
hailing; and 3) the notion that connections between ride-hailing, municipal governance and innovation infl uence 
decision making and decision makers.
Regardless of whether ride-hailing is an example of ‘neoliberalism on steroids’ (Murillo, Buckland, and 
Val 2017) its infl uence and impacts have already begun to transform urban policy in numerous cities. By raising 
and renewing debates about regulating ground transportation in cities, ride-hailing fi rms have in many cases 
succeeded in redefi ning ground transportation options and gaining permission to legally operate.  
Th is case study contributes to a growing body of literature on deepening divides and disruptive 
transformations characterizing cities in the 21st century (Florida 2017; Lee 2018; Sassen 2014). Connected 
to cities and urbanizing regions, to massive economic change and upheaval and associated social, spatial and 
environmental ramifi cations, technology and digitization are thought to be at the leading edge of these changes 
(Storper 2018). As the engines of national economies, cities play a crucial, pivotal role. Th e ways in which 
municipalities respond through regulation, policy, revenue tools and more sets the stage for preparing and 
adapting to disruption. 
Method
Th is paper draws on analysis of public documents, scholarly publications and interviews. A total of 25 meetings 
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with 23 individuals were carried out between February and August 2016.  Eighteen interviewees worked or were 
located in Toronto, Canada, two in Mississauga, Canada and three interviewees provided insight on US-based 
approaches and concerns with respect to ride-hailing. With the exception of four interviews, all were conducted 
as in-person interviews. Five interviews were fi lmed for the purpose of creating a short documentary video 
(Brail, 2016).  Interviews ranged from 30 to 120 minutes in length. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and 
coded thematically.  
Initial interviewees were identifi ed through the creation of a database of leaders from private and public 
sector spheres involved in the process of informing, infl uencing or developing regulations to address ride-hailing, 
and its impacts. Media articles, published reports, legal documents and social media were consulted initially to 
build the database.  A process of snowball sampling was used for subsequent interviews. 
Interviewees included politicians and senior civil servants from local and provincial government, senior 
leadership from taxi brokerages and associations, and ride-hailing fi rms in Toronto. Th e research team also 
interviewed insurance experts, legal experts and policy researchers whose work engaged with ride-hailing. 
Interviews focused on gathering a state of the fi eld from the interviewees’ professional perspectives, addressed 
the disruptive nature of change associated with ride-hailing, and asked interviewees to consider the manner in 
which innovation, public policy and regulation aff ect the operation of ride-hailing. In addition to interviews, 
analysis of public documents, published reports, and media articles was conducted.  Collectively, this material 
helps build a nuanced understanding of perspectives on the emergence and subsequent regulation of ride-
hailing, and more broadly, presents an opportunity to examine the nexus of public-private interaction, debate 
and engagement in the contemporary city.  
Defi nitions, Urban Focus and Governance Challenges
Understanding the context of ride-hailing, the role of digitization and its impacts on economic activity more 
broadly is key to developing greater insight with respect to the emergence of seemingly new industrial activities 
and new models of exchange.  Scholarly discussion has emphasized the signifi cance of defi ning new models 
for mediating transactions through digital platforms. Initially, the term ‘sharing economy’ was widely used to 
describe a variety of digitally mediated activities in which excess capacity of personal goods or services could 
be rented out using digital technologies, generally relying on the use of smartphones. At its most basic, the 
sharing economy represents an eff ort to increase the effi  cient use of goods. Benkler (2004), one of the fi rst 
scholars to write about the convergence of opportunities to share goods or services, mediated by technology and 
digitization, underscored the potential for sharing as an economic activity. 
Scholarly discussion and debate has centred on defi nitions (Benkler 2004; Frenken and Schor 2017; 
Schor 2014; Slee 2015), governance practices and regulatory shifts (Cohen and Zehngebot 2014; Davidson 
and Infranca 2016; Ranchordas 2015), models of innovation through which these types of activities might be 
understood (Frenken 2017; Gans 2016; Sundarajaran, 2016), and controversial, negative impacts (Keil 2017; 
Kenney and Zysman 2016; Schor 2017; Slee 2015). Scholarship in this fi eld appears divided between those 
who focus on profi t-oriented and non-profi t oriented elements of activity. Article titles that include questions 
and statements such as ‘Does sharing mean caring?’ (Ranchordas 2015) or ‘Sharing without caring’ (Belk 2017) 
connect to a strong sense of skepticism and desire for distinguishing the notion of sharing as either an altruistic 
or a profi t-seeking activity. 
Defi nitions and indeed research of sharing economy activities have splintered into two distinct groupings, 
though the boundaries remain blurry and there remains no standardization of terminology. On the one 
hand, emphasis on the term ‘sharing’ is focused on genuine sharing of idle-capacity through community and 
environmentally focused peer-to-peer networks (Finck and Ranchordas 2016) and the creation of sharing-
models for goods and services such as childcare, tools, and food. Frenken (2017:4) suggests that sharing economy 
activities include three signifi cant components: 1) peer-to-peer exchange, 2) temporary access to a good and 
3) making use of idle capacity or underutilization.  While defi ning the rental of one’s home temporarily when 
on a vacation or renting a car from a private individual as part of the sharing economy, using a private vehicle 
to provide taxi services and home ownership exclusively for the purpose of renting out the space full time, 
comprise on-demand economy and product-service economy activities. According to this defi nition, a fi rm 
such as Airbnb can be part of both the sharing economy and the product-service economy. Other terms used 
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to describe auathentic sharing include the not-for-profi t sharing economy (Stark 2017) and the collaborative 
economy, a term which appears primarily in the context of the EU (European Commission 2017). 
In contrast, for profi t-models are increasingly referred to under the term digital platform economy, for-
profi t sharing economy and platform capitalism.  Digital platform economy and platform capitalism research 
focuses on issues related to capitalization, innovation, management, and the negative impacts associated with a 
rise in observations regarding the combination of monopoly ownership, deregulation and increasingly precarious 
labour practices (Kenney and Zysman 2016; Pasquale 2016). 
As evidence that uniform acceptance of defi nitions does not exist, ride-hailing has been defi ned as being in 
the sharing economy (Sundararajan 2016), the on-demand economy (Frenken and Schor 2017) and the digital 
platform economy (Kenney and Zysman 2016). Despite the fact that digital platform economy fi rms benefi t 
from using marketing language and approaches suggesting that they are genuine sharing fi rms, there are clearly 
distinctions between platforms with a predominant focus on monetization and profi t, and platforms primarily 
developed to address environmental and community goals.
A further example of how rapidly the terminology associated with ride-hailing, and particularly its 
largest and currently most prominent fi rm—Uber—has transformed understanding of for-profi t opportunities 
connected to mobile technologies, is that the word ‘uberize’ now appears in both the Cambridge Dictionary and 
the Collins Dictionary.   Th e Cambridge Dictionary (2017) defi nes the word as follows: “to change the market 
for a service by introducing a diff erent way of buying or using it, especially using mobile technology.” It appears 
that uberize entered our lexicon by 2015 (Boudaud 2015) and was named one of top ten words of the year in 
2016 (Stolworthy 2016). 
In addition, while there is a tendency to view the emergence of platform economy activities as unique 
and novel, presenting entirely new challenges to understanding shifts in policy and regulation, in fact there 
are precedents.  Th is approach has been characterized as being void of historic precedent (Davies et al 2017; 
Frenken and Schor 2017), neglecting to consider how previous rounds of disruptive technologies such as the 
emergence of the automobile, electricity and franchising, were debated, accommodated and incorporated into 
governing practices (Biber et al 2017). Davies et al (2017, 214) “highlight some of the many elements of the 
sharing economy that have roots in previous economic eras and suggest an evolution of form rather than radical 
dislocation from a previous model.” One distinction however includes the fact that as new, unanticipated models 
are built, the disruption of traditional sectors governed under separate sets of regulations, each require their own 
new set of regulations.  Rides and rooms, for instance, are neither like one another nor are they governed under 
pre-existing regulatory systems governing previous forms of ground transportation or accommodation.  In the 
case of ground transportation, regulations governing taxi services have in many cases been deemed not to apply 
to ride-hailing practices due to the digital nature of engagement between the platform fi rm, the driver and the 
rider. As a digital intermediary governed by a new set of practices not conceived of in previous iterations of by-
laws managing taxi operations, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (2015) found that the language used to 
defi ne taxi operations by the City of Toronto, did not apply to Uber, for example. 
Also, unlike previous periods of disruptive technological change, the scale of the digital platform economy 
is predominantly urban in terms of presence, impacts and regulatory changes (Davidson and Infranca 2016). 
Platform economy fi rms such as Uber, Lyft, Airbnb and TaskRabbit benefi t from economies of scale found in 
urban areas, both in terms of production and consumption of goods and services (Davidson and Infranca 2016). 
Th is assertion is supported in work produced by think tanks and research arms of fi nance and consulting fi rms 
including Th e Brookings Institution (Hathaway and Muro 2016), McKinsey Global Institute (2016) and JP 
Morgan Chase & Co Institute (Farrell and Greig 2016). Further emphasizing the urban nature of platform 
economy fi rms, a study of Uber’s impact on public transit systems concluded that Uber entered cities according 
to their population rank order. Th at is, they entered larger cities before smaller ones (Hall, Palson, and Price 
2018).  Lashinsky (2017) confi rms this assertion, noting that Uber initially launched in cities that were both 
large in terms of potential markets and that the fi rm perceived to be technologically savvy.  
At the outset, digital platform economy fi rms operated in a legally grey area.  In cities where it fi rst launched, 
for instance, Uber classifi ed itself as a technology company rather than a transportation company, exempting itself 
from expensive taxi laws and regulations.  By insisting that its drivers were independent contractors rather than 
employees, the fi rm managed to evade costly worker protections and benefi ts (Isaac 2014). Placing themselves 
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in a ‘legal void’ (Isaac 2014), Uber protected itself from industry regulations and employer responsibilities, which 
led to problematic relationships between the company and host cities. In a similar vein, Airbnb is described 
as launching its operations “in legal grey zones able to avoid existing accommodation regulations and taxes” 
(Wachsmuth et al 2017, 40).  Th e cavalier, upstart approach that digital platform economy fi rms have adopted 
—of launching fi rst and asking for permission later—has contributed to polarization in terms of how politicians, 
businesses, residents and others perceive the activities of these fi rms.  
In the case of Uber, there is scholarly support for providing after-the-fact permission for it to operate 
through the development of responsive, place-specifi c regulations (Bond 2015; Ranchordas 2015). Th is advice 
appears to be borne out in practice, as Eidelman and Spicer’s (2016) examination of municipal regulatory re-
sponses to Uber’s entrance in 10 large North American cities beginning in 2010 demonstrates. Despite the 
initial categorization of Uber’s services as being in violation of local ground transportation regulations in each 
municipality, all 10 cities studied ultimately legalized and regulated ride-hailing operations by 2016.
To be sure, regulating digital platform economy activities in cities can help to address concerns around 
managing safety, licensing requirements, tax collection, other forms of quality controls and data collection —
however there are outstanding matters that municipal regulations are unlikely to manage. Th ese include concerns 
around wealth creation, increasing inequality and precarious labour. By taking advantage of an economy 
characterized by growing income inequality and precarious labour conditions, digital platform economy fi rms 
contribute to increasing vulnerability—economically and geographically—by encouraging individuals to ‘share’ 
personal items to create value, in the interest of profi t (Donald and Moroz 2017; Schor 2017). 
Ride-hailing in Canada
Ride-hailing entered Canada in 2012 with the launch of Uber in Toronto, Canada’s largest municipality.  For 
the fi rst several years, Uber operated either illegally or outside of regulations—depending on whether one agreed 
that the regulations for existing ground transportation also applied to ride-hailing. In January 2016, Edmonton 
became the fi rst Canadian municipality to develop distinct regulations governing ride-hailing. Regulations 
making ride-hailing a legal activity came into eff ect in Edmonton as of March 2016, however the required 
provincially regulated insurance products were not available until July of that year.  It was not until late 2017 that 
a large, competing fi rm entered the Canadian ride-hailing environment. In December of that year, Uber’s US 
competitor Lyft expanded to Toronto as its fi rst international location (Hartmans 2017). 
As of June 2018, our research shows that ride-hailing services were operating in 22 of Canada’s 30 largest 
Census Metropolitan Areas. In 20 of these 22 cities, ride-hailing was a regulated ground transportation activity. 
Planning is underway to regulate ride-hailing in an additional seven of Canada’s 30 largest cities.. 
It is also important to understand that in most of Canada, the regulation of taxi and limousine services 
is a municipal responsibility. Quebec and British Columbia are both exceptions, and ground transportation is 
primarily managed at the provincial level in these provinces.  In 2012, Uber briefl y off ered its black car service 
in Vancouver, though it was shut down by the provincial Passenger Transportation Board shortly after launching 
(Bailey 2016; Xu 2017). Ever since, ride-hailing has been deemed an illegal activity and barred from operating in 
the province. Although it was anticipated that British Columbia would announce a pilot program for ride-hailing 
in late 2017 (Saltman 2017), a change in provincial leadership in July 2017 appears to have stalled this process. 
Nevertheless, informal ride-hailing operations are reportedly operating in the Vancouver area (Xu, 2017).
 Across the country, ride-hailing’s biggest adversary to date has been the taxi industry. Th e taxi industry is 
over one hundred years old, is heavily regulated, and experienced relatively little innovation in the decades leading 
up to the launch of ride-hailing (Ranchordas 2015). In many North American cities, taxi operations have been 
regulated through complex licensing and medallion systems. As a representative of the taxi industry notes:
Th e reason they put a limit on the number of taxicabs was congestion and to try to, “through 
some social engineering” to ensure that all drivers have an opportunity for income. In Toronto, 
the taxicab ratio is one taxicab for every 500 people, and Montreal is fairly similar. If you look 
at Vancouver, that ratio is about 1 for every 1400 people; when you look at Edmonton that’s 
about 1 for every 900 people, and Calgary is about 1 for every 850 people. (Interview, taxi 
lobby leader)
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Th e number of taxis allowed to operate in each municipality was typically capped, a concession due to the high 
costs of operating a taxi, including commercial insurance that costs upwards of $10,000 per vehicle, plus driver 
licensing fees paid directly to the municipality.  
As with the entrance of other new types of activities and jobs, Canadian statistics that can support tracking 
and analysis of the impacts of the digital platform economy remains in a nascent stage. In early 2017, Statistics 
Canada released a fi rst series of reports attempting to measure the impact of what they termed the ‘sharing 
economy’ on the Canadian economy (Statistics Canada, 2017a; Statistics Canada, 2017b).1 Based on data 
from macroeconomic accounts, Statistics Canada demonstrated that in terms of consumption, nearly 1 in 10 
Canadians used sharing economy services in 2016, spending $1.31B in total. Th e data supported a number 
of expected fi ndings: ride-hailing is used by a greater proportion of people than short-term rental and yet 
accounts for a smaller proportion of overall revenues; younger adults are the most common users of these 
services and a small proportion of the population participates as producers. Due to limitations in capturing 
data from unincorporated businesses and non-residents utilizing these services locally, these reports represent a 
snapshot but not a full picture. Minimal city-level data was reported, indicating that 17.6% of Ottawa residents 
had used ride-hailing services in the past year, followed by 14.8% of Toronto residents (Statistics Canada 2017b).
Case Study: Toronto
Controversial History and Background
Controversy has been a key part of the narrative associated with the entrance of ride-hailing in Toronto—and 
indeed in many cities around the world as evidenced by protests and attempts to shut it down. In 2012, Uber 
launched its services in Toronto based on the model the company used around the world, asserting itself as 
a technology company that was not required to honour ground transportation regulations—it operated as a 
dispatcher of limousines and then taxis, without a license. Th is approach was confi rmed by an interviewee who 
noted that: “When we launched initially this was an unregulated space, it didn’t look like traditional taxis and 
limousines, but it looked enough like them some people thought it should be categorized in those regulations” 
(Interview, senior Uber leader2). In September 2014, UberX launched in Toronto and relied on the use of a 
mobile app to connect prospective riders with unlicensed drivers and vehicles, much to the concern of the city 
(Cook 2015). 
Th e history of Uber in Toronto is similar to its history in many other cities, not just in terms of its cavalier 
approach to regulations but also in terms of the way it disrupted the existing taxi industry. Lashinsky (2017, 97) 
suggests that this was standard for Uber at the time, indicating that : “A normal company would have arranged 
meetings with regulators to signal their intentions; Uber approached each launch like a guerilla attack, with 
no need to warn the enemy fi rst.” Furthermore, the initial response by Toronto’s elected offi  cials and regulators 
was to attempt to disallow operations—followed by an ultimate change in direction towards accepting and 
accommodating ride-hailing as a legitimate form of ground transportation.  Th e City of Toronto tried at fi rst 
to reign in Uber’s activities by requiring them to follow the same regulations as applied to the taxi industry, and 
fi led a lawsuit. However, a legal expert noted that: 
[Th e City] were told very quickly by the court that the regulations that had been drawn up 
even ten, fi fteen, twenty years ago, certainly didn’t contemplate the type of technology that 
Uber is using and they were not successful in having Uber fi t into the traditional taxi regulation 
framework. (Interview, legal expert)
In July 2015, the Ontario Supreme Court of Justice ruled in response to a City of Toronto request for an 
injunction that Uber was not required to abide by the city’s taxi regulations (Szychta, Bisbee, and Carter 2015). 
It is also notable that the City of Toronto underwent a comprehensive ground transportation review, 
beginning in 2011 and ending with the passage of a new bylaw in June 2014, just a few months prior to the 
launch of UberX. Th e maximum number of taxis permitted to operate in Toronto was pegged to passenger wait 
times, based on an attempt to match the supply of taxis with levels of passenger demand (Cook 2013). In 2013, 
4,489 taxis were permitted to operate in Toronto and on a daily basis, 65,000 taxi trips were reported (Cook, 
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2013: 3). Taxi regulations emphasized passenger and driver safety, increases in the number of accessible taxis, 
and stipulated the types and age of vehicles permitted and identifi ed requirements for vehicular safety features 
such as in-car cameras as well as driver safety features including the requirement for drivers to pass a police 
check and participate in a 17-day training course.  
Within a year of launching UberX, 17,000 riders used the service daily in Toronto. Th e city was concerned 
about insurance and driver capability, as well as negative impacts on the city’s regulated ground transportation 
sector. A city report (Cook 2015) acknowledged that while the taxi and limousine fi rms were in favour of 
banning Uber, the public was strongly in support of enabling Uber to continue to provide services in Toronto. 
Th is set up a debate common to nearly all markets in which ride-hailing launched prior to the development 
of regulations.  In Toronto, taxi and limousine services, under increasing strain and frustration with what was 
perceived as an onerous regulatory system that was deemed not to apply to ride-hailing, organized protests 
and campaigns were launched to dispute the conditions created by an uneven playing fi eld between taxi and 
ride-hailing. Signifi cant public support, however, encouraged in part by Uber’s ability to communicate digitally 
with all their network users in the city, enabled the fi rm to cultivate consumer voices to advocate for ride-
hailing services to remain. In addition, local perceptions were infl uenced by recommendations of public policy 
organizations that worked across government, private sector, academia, associations and the public. For instance, 
MaRS Solutions Lab—a public and social innovation lab, produced a detailed report together with the Province 
of Ontario and City of Toronto suggesting that traditional regulatory systems were no longer aligned with the 
needs of the digital economy and needed to be revised (van den Steenhoven et al, 2016). Th e public nature 
of the debate on whether and how best to regulate was also addressed by a local newspaper’s editorial board 
(Toronto Star, 2016), which suggested that regulating ride-hailing in Toronto provided a way to serve public 
demand and align with economic and social changes precipitated by internet-based technologies.While Uber 
entered Toronto in much the same way as it entered other cities, the fi rm switched tactics as it gained riders and 
built relationships with municipal governments around the world through a coordinated advocacy and lobbying 
eff ort. A senior Uber representative in Toronto noted that: 
One of the key changes we made as a company is really embracing the idea that this new 
business model, ridesharing, should be regulated in cities...So, as we developed in certain cities 
around the world we found a new regulatory model that allowed for consumer protection, 
allowed for public safety, but also allowed for innovation. … Since then… we’ve really been 
working with municipalities to update regulations so that they do refl ect the new technology, 
but also, going forward, allow for continual innovation. 2 (Interview, senior Uber leader)
In less than fi ve years, ride-hailing in Toronto went from being a renegade activity to a regulated activity. 
At a City Council meeting held in spring 2016 to debate whether or not the city should legalize ride-hailing, it 
was noted that 45,000 unregulated trips were being taken per day using the Uber app in Toronto (Moore 2016). 
By passing regulations, the city would be able to charge a licensing fee, collect data, and require passenger and 
vehicle safety measures. Following a tense consultation and debate, Toronto City Council passed regulations on 
May 3, 2016, permitting the operation of private transportation companies in the city, eff ectively legalizing Uber. 
Th ese regulations came into eff ect on July 15, 2016. 
Debates and Regulations
Much of the formal debate about whether or not to permit ride-hailing as a legal activity in Toronto took place 
as understanding, defi nitions, descriptions and analysis of the sector were in their early stages. Formally, there 
was an interest in regulating ride-hailing relatively quickly, however there was also concern about making long-
lasting regulatory decisions in a sector continuing to undergo rapid change and evolution. Furthermore, some 
interviewees noted that in places that quickly developed regulations, those regulations became outdated in 
periods of one year or less as the environment changed.  Hence there was a sense of balancing existing knowledge 
and a desire to regulate what had become a prominent, lawless situation, with an emphasis on thoughtful 
and responsive policy.  As of June 2018, of the nine largest municipalities in closest proximity to Toronto, six 
have approved ride-hailing regulations and ride-hailing services are operating in all nine municipalities. In 
Mississauga, ride-hailing has been operating under a pilot program since July 1, 2017. Ride-hailing operates in 
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Burlington, Markham and Richmond Hill though is not yet regulated in these municipalities. Th is demonstrates 
that municipal governments and elected offi  cials, following a period of upheaval and uncertainty, have for the 
most part been able to address regulatory issues by developing local regulations. It should also be noted, however, 
that the regulations in place—whether they are permanent or pilot initiatives—remain subject to change as 
the sector matures and as more details unfold with respect to implications related to congestion, data analysis 
associated with high-traffi  c routes, and policy directions governing incentives to encourage more shared forms 
of transportation.   
Scholars have suggested that defi ning the sharing economy is critical to creating responsive policy (Finck 
and Ranchordas 2016; Frenken 2017; Rauch and Schleicher 2017). In our research, interviewees’ perspectives 
on the sharing economy varied across what appeared to be a polarized spectrum and refl ected upon ongoing 
debates both in academia, industry and governance. One municipal leader suggested that the term ‘sharing’ was 
incorrect in its application to ride-hailing, commenting that: 
Th at’s why I think this is a very dangerous direction to go, this unregulated economy, that’s 
what it should be called, not a sharing economy, it’s an unregulated, privatized economy that 
takes away accountability from the public… To promote themselves as a sharing economy I 
think it completely misrepresents what they are doing… they’re about deregulation and about 
privatization of government regulated services. (Interview, city councillor)
Another municipal leader acknowledged that many of the types of activities being referred to as comprising a 
new, innovative, sharing economy, were in fact not new at all.  Rather, as activities that previously had taken place 
largely away from the public domain and at a much smaller scale, they would have been previously classifi ed as 
being part of the informal economy:
What is happening is not new, there have always been people in their private vehicles sitting 
in parking lots giving sweet little dollies a lift …What Uber did was … they pulled these little 
pieces of technology into a slick little app, found a bunch of people willing to do what other 
people have been doing for years…and said hey, look at this, and blew it up on a scale and scope 
that’s unprecedented.  (Interview, senior civil servant)
For decades, the idea of restricting the supply of taxis in cities was a well-accepted international practice and 
eff ectively used municipal policy levers to protect employment for taxi drivers. Th e emergence of ride-hailing as 
an alternative to taxis, and the ensuing regulatory debates, raised the question as to whether limiting entry to a 
fi eld was eff ectively privileging a sector and an employment category in a way that licensing and regulation are 
not intended to do. Furthermore, this also raises one of the most challenging elements of debate with respect to 
regulating ride-hailing—that of the sector’s negative impacts on labour and earnings. One interviewee suggested 
that: “Uber has destabilized the industry and is undermining full time work for taxi drivers and is violating our 
current bylaws and is acting as a renegade corporation that thinks they can operate above the law.” (Interview, 
city councillor)
Another issue that arose focused on the need or desirability of provincial-level legislation and the role of 
the provincial government in regulating ride-hailing. Eidelman and Spicer (2016) note that though ground 
transportation as a whole is traditionally a municipal regulatory issue, there is an increased emphasis and de-
mand for policy makers at all levels of government to participate in multilevel urban governance processes as 
they relate to the regulation of ride-hailing and ground transportation services and policy more broadly.  Indeed, 
Toronto City Council, passed a resolution at the same time as they passed private transportation company regu-
lations, requesting that:
87.   City Council direct the City Manager to use the new regulatory framework to begin a 
conversation with the provincial government, other municipalities and planning authorities to 
develop a more integrated approach to transit and transportation policy
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88.  City Council request the Province of Ontario to regulate Private Transportation Companies 
(City of Toronto 2016). 
A request by Toronto City Council, the 6th largest government in Canada, to seek assistance from the 
Province of Ontario in developing an integrated regulatory framework for managing private transportation 
companies is a signal of the challenges faced in regulating ride-hailing on a municipality-by-municipality basis 
as well as indicative of the resource-intensive nature of managing and regulating these activities.  
Interviewees noted that any provincial level regulations would need to take into account the balance be-
tween oversight issues common to all municipalities and place-specifi c diff erences. For example, in Toronto’s 
dense core, acquiring a taxi by street-hail (the practice of standing on the street and waving down a taxicab) 
is a far more prominent practice than in a suburban municipality such as Mississauga (Interviews). It is also 
an aspect of the taxi business that has been hardest hit (Interview, taxi association leader). Th e obsolescence of 
street-hailing and the move towards a system of digital hailing is however one of the driving features that Uber 
founders capitalized on as a way to both circumvent the taxi medallion system and as a way to improve effi  ciency 
of service for drivers and riders (Camp 2017).
Despite calls for higher levels of government to engage in regulation and policy processes regarding the 
platform economy, one industry association representative partly joked: “If I were to write the ten commandments 
someday of politics: if you want something to never happen, get all levels of government involved. You’re sure 
that nothing will ever happen.” (Interview, taxi association board member).
Ride-hailing, Governance and Innovation 
While the taxi industry has to date borne the brunt of the losses associated with the rising popularity of ride-
hailing, the ultimate goal of ride-hailing fi rms is not to decimate taxis but rather to push towards a complete 
transformation of urban transportation networks. Eff orts towards building safe, reliable and aff ordable 
autonomous vehicle technology, are both pitting technology fi rms, automakers and ride-hailing fi rms against 
one another and at the same time bringing them together in targeted joint partnerships. If and when autonomous 
vehicles are developed as a safer, reasonably priced and widely produced alternative to person-driven vehicles, 
some suggest that self-driving cars may account for up to 80% of vehicle miles travelled in the next few decades 
(McFarland 2017).
In addition to advancing technological innovation, ride-hailing as a practice has been touted as signaling 
a municipality’s openness. Eidelman and Spicer (2016) note that in Toronto, Mayor Tory spoke out in favour 
of support for adopting regulations to accommodate ride-hailing, and couched his remarks in terms of 
demonstrating an openness to innovation in a 21st century city. On the fl ip side, Donald and Moroz (2017) 
bemoan that ride-hailing fi rms adopt a strategy of shaming unsupportive cities by implying that cities who do 
not develop uber-friendly regulation are outdated and lack innovativeness.  
Directly connecting support for ride-hailing with a city’s openness to the tech sector is not a political 
strategy unique to Toronto. In San Francisco, the headquarters location for ride-hailing unicorns Uber and Lyft, 
Mayor Ed Lee was widely understood to support a pro-tech platform and is credited for having strong infl uence 
over the decision to regulate ride-hailing in California (Flores and Rayle, 2017). 
In Toronto, debates regarding the connection between accommodating regulation and innovation were all 
too evident. Connotations about the ways in which demonstrating openness to new types of activities at the 
city-level helps to promote innovation and new business attraction were common in interviews. For example, 
one interviewee suggested that “If Toronto moves more aggressively and ahead of the game, I think that 
helps our reputation as well for attracting new investment, attracting talented citizens, and nurturing our own 
companies” (Interview, legal expert). Certainly, this approach—combined with the existence of strong talent and 
investments in artifi cial intelligence in the Toronto region—played a part in Uber’s announcement in May 2017 
that it was opening an autonomous vehicle research centre in the city, with a University of Toronto computer 
science professor at the helm (Allen 2017). Based on a case study of San Francisco, “the fi rst city in the world to 
embrace ridesourcing”, the authors conclude that a key factor underlying support for the sector was “a growing 
consensus among the city’s political class about the importance of forging a welcoming environment for new 
technology companies for San Francisco’s prosperity and growth.” (Flores and Rayle, 2017, 3757). While mainly 
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conjecture, it remains to be seen whether and how a municipality’s willingness and openness to accommodate 
new activities such as ride-hailing might translate into a continuing source of competitive advantage.  
Conclusion
Th e objectives of this paper were to present a framing of three tensions connected to: ride-hailing’s controver-
sial history; binary positioning of local debates during the regulation decision-making process and the ways 
in which narratives regarding openness to innovation impact regulatory decisions. 
A case study of Toronto exemplifi es the history of ride-hailing as a service that aggressively entered the 
city, disputed its right to operate, and legally established a case requiring the municipal government to establish 
a set of regulations specifi cally directed to ride-hailing as a form of ground transportation distinctive from taxi 
and limousine. Scholarly emphasis on defi nitions and distinctions regarding the sharing economy, on-demand 
economy, collaborative economy and digital platform economy (Belk 2004; Frenken 2017; Frenken and Schor 
2017; Schor 2014; Slee 2015) while important in building a base that theorizes the emergence of the digital 
platform economy, appear to have had little impact on Toronto’s municipal policy response. Th is may be 
because regulatory processes, particularly at the municipal level, are focused predominantly on learning from 
other urban examples, and addressing concerns and needs identifi ed at the local level. Municipal regulations 
emphasize sector-specifi c approaches (i.e.: ride-hailing, short term room rentals) rather than the larger scale 
impacts of the digital platform economy.  Th e urban nature of the digital platform economy means that many 
cities already stretched by increasing populations and austerity budgets are attempting to manage complex 
governing processes to develop not one, but two new sets of regulations addressing digital platform economy 
interventions in ground transportation and short term room rentals. 
From the period of entry and through the regulatory process, debates continued to be characterized 
as binary: Uber vs. Taxi. It is increasingly clear however, that the long-term impact of ride-hailing on cities 
and transportation networks remains uncertain, opening up the opportunity for additional municipal policy 
levers to address bigger picture changes. While the hardest hit sector in the short term has been the taxi 
industry, Uber ultimately has set its sights on transforming urbanites’ desire for private automobile owner-
ship. Although ride-hailing is promoted as an environmentally friendly and less expensive alternative to car 
ownership, there is little evidence that car ownership has declined so far in a signifi cant way (Lashinsky 2017). 
Additionally, concerns regarding increasing congestion in the city cores of New York and San Francisco have 
been pegged to increasing numbers of ride-hailing vehicles on the streets (Cortright 2017; San Francisco 
County Transportation Authority 2017). As the think tank City Observatory notes, the local price of park-
ing has the greatest infl uence on the use of ride-hailing (Cortright 2017). Th is is further evidence that while 
permitting ride-hailing may be one element of a municipality’s ground transportation policy, it connects to 
part of a larger system. Th e intersections between parking costs and ride-hailing is a reminder that policies 
directed towards one aspect of a local transportation system can have intended and unintended impacts across 
the system.    
Finally, with respect to questions of whether regulations that are permissive of ride-hailing are also sug-
gestive of a municipality’s openness to innovation, evidence from Toronto and other cities suggests that there 
is a connection between the introduction of regulations that are attractive to ride-hailing fi rms and invest-
ment attraction. Certainly, in terms of political infl uence, it appears that narratives connecting attraction and 
retention of innovative fi rms with policies that support ride-hailing operations, are aligned. 
Alongside managing regulations and economic development opportunities, cities also need to ask wheth-
er the policy and regulatory changes being made with respect to accommodating ride-hailing in cities are ef-
fectively and effi  ciently designed. Th at is, will they lead to opportunities for inclusive prosperity and growth 
overall, or will they result in increasing inequality and increasing socioeconomic divisions?
Th is paper, through an exploration of prominent tensions surrounding the operation, expansion and 
regulation of ride-hailing, addresses the manner in which ride-hailing has gone from a renegade activity to 
a regulated one. Using the City of Toronto as a case study, the examination highlights how the entrance of 
a single multinational fi rm can force a municipal policy turn. In a relatively short period of time, the City 
of Toronto moved from a system of limiting and highly regulating ground transportation—to opening its 
ground transportation system up to private transportation companies. Th e story of Toronto is shares many 
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similarities with other municipalities this respect.  
A fi nal and important observation is the way in which debates about the legality of ride-hailing have 
increased the general public’s interest in issues around regulation. Th is is another reminder that a polarizing 
debate can help to bring attention to urban policy matters that may otherwise be considered dull, tedious or 
strictly academic.
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Notes
1  At the time of the report’s release, news stories suggested that Statistics Canada ought to have used an alter-
nate term, rather than the disputed ‘sharing economy’ term to describe these activities (Israel 2017).
2  Th is interview was fi lmed for the purposes of creating an informational video, therefore the interviewee’s 
identity is not confi dential.
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